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SUBJECT TO SURVEILLANCE: GENOCIDE LAW
AS EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE OBJECT
TAWIAANSAH*
ABSTRACT

This article analyzes the discourse on genocide
from two angles: the legal genesis of the term in the
1940s and subsequent legal "capture" of the
concept of genocide, and a recent socio-political
critique of the legal meaning of genocide. The
article suggests that a cross-disciplinary critique of
genocidal violence not only describes the event and
the victim, but also produces knowledge of them as
discursive "objects." The key issue is the
"surveillance" role of the outside observer, also
produced as such in discursive relation to the
object. At stake in this view of genocide law as
epistemology is the capacity to reimagine law in
order to help us make hard choices about how,
whether, and when to intervene in events that may
be characterized as genocide.
INTRODUCTION: ELEMENTS OF MEANING

The French philosopher Alain Badiou begins his book, The
Century, 1 with a quotation from Jean Genet. Badiou asks: "What is
a century? I have in mind Jean Genet's preface to his play, The
Blacks. 2 In it, [Genet] asks ironically: 'What is a black man?'

•LL.B. (Toronto), Ph.D. (Columbia). Visiting Professor, Case Western Reserve
School of Law. Professor of Law, New England Law I Boston. I thank the Board
ofTrustees at New England for a summer stipend. My thanks to Colin Perrin,
Jessie Hill, Kenneth Ledford, Ana Dopico, Patrick Deer, and Robert Clark, and
the faculty at Case Western, for sharing their thoughts on an earlier version of
this article. I thank the student editors at WUJR, whose edits improved the
prose.
ALAIN BADIOU, THE CENTURY (Alberto Toscano trans., Polity Press 2007)
(2005).
2
JEAN GENET, THE BLACKS: A CWWN SHOW (Bernard Frechtman trans., Grove
Press 1960).
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Adding at once: 'And first of all, what colour is he?"' 3 Badiou
assumes Genet asks the question ironically, as if the answer should
be obvious, and he poses the question through Genet because the
meaning of "a century" would seem to be obvious too, at first
appearance. But of course, it is not.
This semantic query is the point of departure for the current
analysis of genocide law. The meaning of the term would seem to
be obvious; indeed, at a recent conference, when mention was
made of the current undertaking, the response was: "But everyone
knows the meaning of genocide. The question is whether or not
legally it applies to the facts, isn't it?" This article suggests that
what seems obvious about genocide is in fact the very thing that is
deceptive. Genocide as the name and specification of a category of
violence provides us with a kind of knowledge, an epistemology,
about the world and about ourselves that hides certain truths.
This article will argue that genocide law- the legal nomination
of forms of violence as genocide and what we mean by that
nomination-has engendered a discourse on global violence. This
discourse, I suggest, reinforces ways of separating the world into
political subjects and apolitical objects. The former reside within a
world where the violence of genocide is deemed to be radically
absent. The latter live with the constant threat of genocidal
violence; put otherwise, the objects of the discourse are susceptible
to genocidal violence. Genocide describes the state of violence or
anomie within whose proximity they live.
The argument goes further to suggest that genocide as a
discourse-much like the concept of race at the height of Western
imperialism in the nineteenth century that genocide discourse
inherits-maintains this division between humans at an almost
immutable level. Indeed, race discourse has reinforced the
normative underpinnings of genocide; as Badiou puts it, "we
cannot but recognize, the unceasing burden of questions of race"
when considering some of the central issues that animated the last
century's movements and innovations, from law and politics to
morality and economics.4 The reinforcement of this division
between subjects and objects operates at an institutional level (i.e.
through domestic and international juridical bodies) as a political
form of governance. The law axiomatically enforces the
maintenance of political forms. The law on genocide is itself, as
epistemology, a political form of governance.

3
4

BADIOU, supra note I, at 1.
BADIOU, supra note l, at 15.
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This article describes and analyzes the origins of the law on
genocide 5 from an interdisciplinary perspective. It looks at the
genesis of the term as a legal, political, sociological, and cultural
event. The word's origins will be examined with a view to
outlining the legal and other elements of meaning that have come
to characterize the subsequent discourse. My aim is to show the
production of those elements as the knowledge of genocide within
its historically situated moment.
The first task will be to think about what the "inventor" of the
term, Raphael Lemkin, meant by the term he coined. In
undertaking that analysis, I deploy something like a linguistic or
genealogical methodology to look at three things: first, what
Lemkin says about the term; second, how Lemkin's words are
generic, in the sense that they reflect certain cultural strains
specific to the time and the context (mid-twentieth century Europe,
the World War, the backdrop of European imperialism, and so on);
and third, the interpretation of Lemkin' s words or intentions with
respect to the meaning of genocide from a modem, post-legal
perspective. The latter, in its management of the latent and
suppressed cultural-historical strains within Lemkin's formulation,
highlights the policing elements of the discourse on genocide.
As noted earlier, the law on genocide polices the categorization
of humans in relation to violence; the primary division is between
the political subject and the apolitical object of the discourse.
Within the latter half of the twentieth century, that division
coalesced around a dichotomy between the global North and South
in their relationship to violence (and to each other). Genocide
discourse, as epistemology and representation, produces a sense of
the object and a way of knowing the world. Interrogating that sense
and that production will help us to make the hard legal and
political choices about whether, how, and when to intervene in a
global crisis event.

I. LEMKIN: GENOCIDE AS LAW
The term genocide, as noted earlier, was coined by Raphael
Lemkin in his book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of
Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress. 6 Here
is the passage that defines and explains the meaning of the term:
5

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A.
Res. 260A (III), U .N . Doc. A/RES/2601II[A-C) (Dec. 9, 1948).

6

RAPHAEL LEMKIN , Ax!S RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: LAWS OF OCCUPATION,
ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS (1944).
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New conceptions require new tem1s. By "genocide"
we mean the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic
group. This new word, coined by the author to
denote an old practice in its modem development, is
made from the ancient Greek word genos (race,
tribe) and the Latin cide (killing), thus
corresponding in its formulation to such words as
tyrannicide, homocide [sic], infanticide, etc.
Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily
mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except
when accomplished by mass killings of all members
of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a
coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the
destruction of essential foundations of the life of
national groups, with the aim of annihilating the
groups themselves.7
Lemkin's book is a compilation and analysis of "the texts of
laws and decrees of the Axis Powers, and of their puppet regimes,
issued for the government of areas occupied by their military
forces in Europe." 8 Lemkin discusses a little-considered example
of the concept of genocide as destruction, rather than simply mass
killing: in the case of Alsace-Lorraine, Lemkin notes that "[i]n
other countries, especially in Alsace-Lorraine and Luxembourg,
genocide in the economic field was carried out .. . ." 9 Lemkin did
not distinguish between incorporated and occupied territories
under the Nazis, except with respect to the techniques of genocide.
Lemkin named several means by which genocide was effectuated:
political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious,
and moral. 10 Otherwise, the laws of occupation per se entailed the
practice of genocide throughout Europe.
Lemkin's definition, then, seems to emphasize a process rather
than simply an end result or product (death). It is a process whose
aim is destruction of a group that Lemkin conceives of as a
national entity. But the definition deploys various tropes that are
embedded within the words Lemkin uses. That is, these words
have their own historical, mythical or narrative implications: genos
as "race, tribe," for instance, and the idea of a "new" term to
7

Id. at 79 (italics in original).
Id. at 82.
9
Id. at 86.
JO Id. at 82-90.

8
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describe an "old" experience in its "modem" form. Indeed, the
form that the word struggles to define is itself a "reversion."
Lemkin's definition is progressivist in that it invites the
perception that legal definition-of a form of violence that seemed
to have marked the conflicts of his time-is the means of a
progression or escape from that form of violence: from tribalism to
nation, from (mere) death, implying arbitrary violence, to
destruction and its coordinated processes. But the very
progressivism of the definition suggests also an inner ambivalence.
It is as if Lemkin saw the law and the legal specification and
calibration of violence as salvific. Lemkin' s definition of genocide,
the "new" term, held the promise of hope for the end of this form
of violence, not just its juridical management (i.e. as a form of
justice).
The element of salvation (law as salvific) may also be seen in
the reading of genocide's generic 11 meaning as related to identity.
That is, Lernkin's conception of law as generically salvific-or
within the genre of salvation discourses-is evident at various
points within his text. For instance, invoking the traditional
division of the world into civilized nations and barbarous races,
Lemkin seems to have some difficulty conceptualizing the
Germans who are, after all, a civilized (and civilizing) people. The
dilemma is resolved in the dream of positive law as law only when
expressive of morality, and further resolved through a strict and
essentialist moral hierarchy between the belligerents on the basis
of identity.
Of the Allies, Lernkin notes in his preface that, "the author
feels that such evidence [of the laws of occupation] is especially
necessary for the Anglo-Saxon reader, who, with his innate respect
for human rights and human personality, may be inclined to
believe that the Axis regime could not possibly be as cruel and
ruthless as it has been hitherto described. " 12 In the same vein, he
collects all Germans together and insists that the issue of war and
the abuses committed are "the responsibility of the German people
treated as an entirety," 13 since all have benefited: "Indeed, all

11

By "generic" I mean conventional, but this also indexes "genocide" as
constitutive of other generic discourses specific to the time: on race, tribalism,
barbarism, violence, imperialism, the law, and so on. For an analysis of genre as
discourse, see, e.g., JOHN FROW, GENRE (Routledge 2006) and TZVETAN
TODOROV, GENRES IN DISCOURSE (Catherine Porter trans., Cambridge 1990).
12
LEMKIN, supra note 6, at ix.
13
Id at xiii.
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groups of the German nation had their share in the spoils of
occupied Europe." 14
In contrast to the "innate" morality of the Anglo-Saxon, he
characterizes the Germans' militarism as "the most virulent
because it is based upon a highly developed national and racial
emotionalism . . . . " 15 Lem.kin then suggests that "[t]he United
Nations in the present war are faced with a tremendous task: to
destroy this amalgamation of master-race mythology and
aggressive technology which makes of the German people a kind
of technified myth that stupefies the world .... [T]he Germans
will be impelled to replace their theory of master race by a theory
of a master morality, international law, and true peace." 16
Traversing the legal conception of the new crime of genocide is
this morality play with its mythic archetypes: the morally innocent
Anglo-Saxon and the militant Teuton. It may well be that
Lem.kin's characterization here, a minor rhetorical aside in an
otherwise dispassionate and detailed account of the German laws
of occupation, was motivated by a flattering appeal to his (Allied)
readership. 17 But these marginal references nonetheless express
stereotypes of the time: the Anglo-Saxon is "innately" moral,
notwithstanding the ravages of Britain's imperial wars, which are
rationalized as the duty of empire and the "white man's burden" 18
and, as such, not militaristic in the pejorative sense. And the
Germans had, after all, twice in the same century "stupefied" the
world with the arrogance of their martial ambitions in the East.
Thus, the conception of genocide imports, through these marginal
references, a way to resolve the projection of a civilized nation as
militaristic: the practice of genocide is the reversion 19 of the
civilized nation to an ancient barbarism in modem, technified
form.
It is possible to see here the intimation of a division between
civilization and state violence (displaced, on one level, by calling it
"barbarism"), as well as between the law's morality (moral
content) and law1s other. The myth's stupefying power, within the
text, inheres in an implicit denial of a barbaric violence ascribed to
the modem nation-state, even as there is a repressive strain
14

Id. at xiv.

ts Id.

Id.
I am grateful to Kenneth Ledford for this observation.
18
Rudyard Kipling, The White Man's Burden, in THE WHITE MAN'S BURDENS:
AN ANTHOLOGY OF BRITISH POETRY OF THE EMPIRE (Chris Brooks & Peter
Faulkner eds., Exeter 1996) ( 1899).
19
Id. at 80.
16

17
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attributed to the law's civilizing narrative: to destroy, to impel. The
generic story of moral innocence elides or suppresses that strain.
Thus, Lemkin's text harbors the law's own self-repression of its
violence, deflected as the barbarism of a militant other, or
militancy as other to law. The boundary between the law,
expressed by the moral and liberatory forces of the Allies, and its
other expressed in the "German juggernaut," is enforced through
archetypes of innocence: the Anglo-Saxon is untainted here by the
idea of a militant master-race "myth" of his own.
The price paid for this innocence of the modem nation-state is
to dehistoricize the very idea of state violence. Hence, Lemkin
notes that "[i]t required a long period of evolution in civilized
society to mark the way from wars of extermination, which
occurred in ancient times and in the Middle Ages, to the
conception of wars as being essentially limited to activities against
armies and states. 20 As examples of "wars of extermination,"
Lemkin cites to the "special wholesale massacres" of Genghis
Khan and the "odious scourges of Tamerlane [sic]," as well as the
destruction of Jerusalem by Titus in AD 72. 21 As a throwback to
this period, genocide seems strangely otherworldly and out of time.
The effect of this is also to locate the legal origins of the law's
dominion over violence, or at least that of genocide, in the farthest
reaches of history, or, like myth, within a timeless frame. At once,
therefore, the violence of this war is conceived within the legal
framework, as generic discourse, as out of time and of history.
Lemkin goes on to describe genocide as the aim to destroy a
nation or group through a two-tiered process: first, the destruction
or eradication of the "national characteristics" of the group, and
second, the imposition of the "national characteristics" of the
oppressor or occupier22 • It is noteworthy that the target group be a
nation, or have some national status: the definition of genocide
(quoted above) conceives of a progression from tribal to national
violence. Thus, although in its content it is an ancient form of
violence, in form--or in formal legal terms-genocide could occur
only after the rise of the nation-state within European history. If we
imagine the beginning of the rule of law to be the beginning of
history, as suggested by Paul W. Kahn, 23 and the beginning of
20

Id at 80.
Id. at 80 n.3.
22
Id. at 80.
23
PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP 17 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1999) ("History begins with a communal
act of will, imposing a reasonable order on self and polity. This is the beginning
oflaw's rule.").
21
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history to be the rise of the nation-state, as argued by Michael
Hardt and Antonio Negri, 24 then the idea that genocide is a
phenomenon of the nation-state rehistoricizes this hitherto barbaric
and ancient form of violence; that is, genocide occurs within
history, specifically modern history, and occurs within the rule of
law.
The idea of genocide as temporal and historical is further
reinforced in another footnote where Lemkin suggests that
"[a]nother term could be used for the same idea [as genocide],
namely, ethnocide, consisting of the Greek word 'ethnos'nation- and the Latin word 'cide. "' 25 A connection, then, is forged
between the ideas of race and nation. The latter takes on some of
the originary, tribal sense of the former. As such, ancient wars of
extermination and modern genocide are seen as continuous, linked
together as "blood wars," yet severed temporally by the advent of
law. There may have been "wars of extermination" in the past, but
genocide could only occur in a culture determined by laws, with
the nation-state marking both the inauguration of the civilized
order, the break with a primitive world and, at the same time,
marking the origins of the possibility of genocide.
But as with all generic discourse, there is within this original
formulation of genocide a paradox: on the one hand, genocide is a
modem phenomenon, nation against nation; on the other hand, the
civilized nation reverts to an ancient practice from which primitive
state it has long since evolved. In the former, genocide represents
the people as nation (ethnos); in the latter, genocide indexes the
people as tribe (genos). Reversion itself thus suggests something
ancient, even atemporal, about the nation-state. This leads to a
legal resolution of the paradox. Coupled with the story of
innocence-of the Allies, through the elision of their own myths of
racial and moral superiority-two things are reinforced by the idea
of genocide as reversion. One is that the link between nation and
race suggests continuity, in that some nations (the Allies) are
inherently incapable of the barbarism to which others (the
Germans, in this instance) naturally, militaristically, revert. The
other thing reinforced is this idea of something original, even
cosmic, about the struggle in Europe, which emphasizes the
timeless, ahistorical sense in which this original conception of
genocide is framed.
24

MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO N EGRI, EMPIRE 4 (Harvard Univ. Press 2000)
(history of the modern nation-state began with the Peace of Westphalia).
25
L EMKIN, supra note 6, at 79 n. l.
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Once more, therefore, the genre of legal discourse on violence,
indexed in the margins of Lemkin's text, enables an escape from
the apparent contradiction of a link between a civilized order and
mass, exterminatory violence by displacing that violence- and as
such, the nation as civilized self-outside of time. The "nation" is
by definition incapable of destructive violence on this scale.
In the space vacated by law's violence we see the operation of a
progressive yet static (timeless) idea of law, a regime that
·precipitated the end of ancient barbarism. Barbarism is thus the
law's ab initio as well as its other, but always outside the gates
(dehors the text). Maintaining this narrative oflaw's innocence as a
function of the law against genocide means that we repose in the
law the relinquishment of an apparent contradiction of the nation
as indexed by the violence (barbarism) that inaugurates, attends,
and perpetuates the nation-state, and the rule of law itself.
The originary framing of genocide depends upon a cordon
sanitaire. The conception requires a moral boundary that
essentializes the difference between "them" and "us." The original
conception of genocide as new law is thus invested with an
"inherent" moral authority that is backed by the power of the
nation-state's own discourse on violence, and vice versa. In this
sense, the legal conception is disciplinary, following the dictates of
formal or positive legal analysis and reform. It is not critical, in the
sense of an awareness that the marginal but conventional tropes,
metaphors, categories and elements of meaning reassert the
problems that attend the disciplinary conceptualization of violence:
the problem, for instance, of a suppressed reinscription of the law's
own violence.
None of this, of course, is to critique Lemkin's own effortsquite the contrary. In the midst of total war and massive human
destruction and suffering, Lemkin's innovation reflects a deep faith
in the human capacity for transcendence. But the articulation of
that faith is, as with all else, historically contingent. As genocide
inherits its discursive history from the genres of race, imperialism
and militarism, so too the post-war discourse on genocide subtends
the genealogy of the term's original conceptualization. The central
argument of this article involves what this means for how we think
of and deploy genocide as a legal term of art.
This, then, is the frame within which genocide is conceived in
the mid-twentieth century. Modem history begins with the nationstate; therefore genocide as "ethnocide" is the violence of
extermination perpetrated within modem history. At the same time,
genocide as reversion to ancient barbarism is a diifoursive irruption
within the narrative stasis of state (legal) discourse. Thus, within
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the story of a severance between the nation-state and genocidal
violence, the normative frame cannot contain this irruption, which
threatens to spill out and eradicate the border. The legal
signification of genocide indexes a desire for containment and the
need for a fixed (inherent) moral borderline between the "self' of
the nation-state and the violence of the self suppressed and
displaced onto the barbaric foreigner. This element of
containment-including, as I hope to show in the following, the
containment and control of disciplinarity as such (the discipline of
genocide knowledge and discourse )--constitutes a principal
characteristic of the discourse on genocide as, following Lemkin, a
legal category and a legal event.
Thus far, I have attempted to understand the initial conception
of genocide both through what Lemkin says in his text and what he
implies within the tropes and metaphors he deploys to express his
intention. This intention is both conventional and disciplinary with
respect to the overlapping terrains of law, politics, and morality.
Whilst the text of Axis outlines the elements and criteria to define
the "new" crime of genocide, the marginal framework for
conceptualizing the violence invokes and (re)animates old
narratives and ideas about race, imperialism, tribe, blood, myth,
and identity. The (inter)textual projection is true to a discipline of
law (positive law) as the vehicle for categorizing and controlling
the relationship between these older strains or narratives and
modem, "technified" violence. Hence, the legal conception of
genocide imagines the law itself as a border that protects the
subject, within the present, from the suppressed intimations of its
own violence. In effect, within this initial formulation, the subject
as index of the nation-state is incapable, innately and essentially, of
perpetrating the (modem) form of an atavistic violence
conceptualized as genocide. As such, the legal conception suggests
a disciplinary reading of violent conflict and the reformist
ambitions of law.
As a specific, historical intervention within the larger juridical
discourse on violence, the text and its subtexts disclose how the
law operates, and is deployed, in relation to massive violent events
that precipitate the search for new forms of expression and legal
control. In effect, the conception of genocide as a legal event
discloses the meaning of law itself, both in its self-reflection as an
ex post form of knowledge about the world, and through critique as
an ex ante disciplinary operation that creates and polices the world
through the event it construes as juridical.
Thus, the original conception of genocide involves at its core
the idea of law as an operation to separate, suppress, and police the

2010]

GENOCIDE LAW AS EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE OBJECT

41

boundary between humans arranged on a political and moral grid.
The metaphor that captures this sense of law is that of the border.
The law is the border that performs three disciplinary operations in
relation to violence. First, the border specifies a distinction
between a civilized political subject that is not barbarous, i.e., that
is incapable of militarism, the violence of the other. The border
encapsulates nonviolence inasmuch as the border, as law, saves the
other from the other's violence. But the border is a moral
.imposition, anenforcement: it "impels" its moral order and,
through war, does so in a violent way. The border is itself a form
of violence. The second operation of the border, then, is to elide
this element of its own violence by displacement. Violence thus
displaced, the border has enabled a separation between the subject
and the object. The third operation of the border is to police that
separation. In order to effectuate this operation, the border must
maintain the innocence of the subject (and, as such, the "political
subjectivity" of the subject is a posit of innocence) by separating
the subject from any implication in this form of violence, defined
as genocidal.
.The three aspects of the law as border-separation,
suppression/displacement, and policing-become evident from a
discursive analysis of the concept of genocide. But the discourse
on genocide, including genocide literature, genocide studies, the
legal and political deployments of and debates around the term,
and the term's historical and sociological evolution, replicates the
same tropes and effects of the law as border. Within the larger
schema, following Edward Said, this operation of law as border,
i.e., what we do with the term and its meaning irrespective of
authorial intent, may be a function of "dominating, coercive
systems of knowledge"26 produced-at specific historical
moments-by the discursive subject concerning the object, of
which genocide law as epistemology, as disciplinary legal
knowledge, is an example. In the next section, the translation of the
concept of genocide from law to sociology, and from law to
politics, plays out-and is therefore limited in the same ways bythe effects of genocide legal discourse as a coercive system of
knowledge that polices the border between subject and object as
different categories of the human in relation to violence.

26

Edward Said, Orienta/ism Reconsidered, 27 RACE & CLASS 14 ( 1985)
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II. SHAW: GENOCIDE AS WAR
In the previous section, I analyzed the conceptualization of
genocide as law, or the production of legal knowledge of violence
as genocide (genocide discourse), through the metaphor of the
border whose operation is threefold: separation of kinds or forms
of knowledge, primarily of the subject from a knowledge of its
own violence; suppression of this knowledge of violence (and
displacement of this knowledge onto the genocidal other); and
policing the separation. The consequence of the policing operation
of the border is twofold: to keep the subject from knowing itself,
and to perpetuate the "knowing" of the other as intrinsically
violent. In other words, the law as border manages a separation
internal, as it were, to the subject; by maintaining the subject in its
role as observer of the world, it divorces the subject from the
capacity to realize its own political subjectivity. As observer of the
world, the subject maintains its hegemony over the object of the
discursive operation. Thus, the second consequence of the policing
operation of the border is to permit the dominance of the subject
over the object of the discourse: the other is "objectively"
genocidal and, thereby, precluded from its own access to political
subjectivity, to subject-hood.
In the following, I argue that the discursive operation of the
border as creating a split within the subject and between the
subject and object of the discourse on genocide extends beyond the
legal conceptualization of genocide as disclosed within Lemkin's
original formulation. It extends also to other domains that replicate
the border's indicia and operation. In other words, it is the
discourse on genocide, or how we think about violence of this
kind, and not any particular disciplinary field of inquiry, that
creates the border and thereby precludes access to political
subjectivity. To show how this works, as well as to underline its
preclusive normativity, I turn to a recent book by Martin Shaw, a
sociologist, that attempts to divorce the conceptualization of
genocide from its "capture" within law. Because the attempted
recapture remains disciplinary, it does not escape the discursive
operation of the border. However, the consequences within the real
world are serious, as I hope to show in relation to Shaw's analysis
of the situation in Darfur, Sudan.
Shaw's recent book, What is Genocide? 27 , provides a
comprehensive analysis of the concept of genocide. In some ways
the book is a watershed: in its critique of the legal discourse on
27

MARTfN SHAW, WHAT IS GENOCIDE?

(2007).

.,. ..._..._.......
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genocide, it encapsulates all the thinking within other discursive
domains- historical, sociological, political, and ethical-from
Lemkin to the present on the subject of genocide. A principal aim
of the book is to sever as far as possible genocide's link to the law
as conceptually definitive of this form of violence. Shaw states:
"The legal concern with individual responsibility of perpetrators
meant that legal means were an indirect way of getting at the more
fundamental issues involved. The constraints of legal standards of
proof meant that law was hardly the most satisfactory discipline in
which to come to balanced judgments about historical episodes, let
alone creative theoretical interpretations." 28 He therefore suggests
that "'genocide' probably has a more promising future as a
sociological and political than as a legal concept. "29
Shaw's analysis of genocide is disciplinary. My critique of his
approach will therefore lead to the conclusion that despite Shaw's
success in moving "genocide" from the domain of positive law to
the sociological and political domains, the discourse on genocide
that evolves from this conceptual translation effectuates the same
result. That is, genocide as a sociological and political concept
fun.ctions discursively as a border, much as did genocide as a legal
concept: it separates the subject from a "self-knowing" of its own
violence, suppresses that not-knowing, and polices the threat of its
return. Indeed, genocide's translation-Shaw considers it a
return-to the sociological and political domains operates as an
extension of a legal mandate over a broader classification of
violence. As such, genocide as a sociological and political concept
increases the potential for law's violence- manifested, for
example, in the form of military intervention to prevent and punish
genocide. It increases the policing apparatus of the discourse on
genocide.
For Shaw, genocide is first and foremost a social
phenomenon- it happens to and within societies-and so its
proper understanding should be sociological. Shaw posits the
adoption of "a critical theoretical approach" 30 to genocide: the first
part of his book is historical analysis, the second attempts to
"understand the main terms of genocide debates in the light of
sociological theory; how we should develop social theory itself to
take account of genocide's challenges; and how we should begin
the task of explanation."31 His aim is to clarify a conception of
28

Id. at 8 (emphasis in original).
Id. (emphasis in original).
30
Id. at 13.
31 Id.
29
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genocide that is "relevan[t] for anti-genocidal action." In the
result, Shaw attempts to wrest the concept of genocide from law
and relocate it firmly within sociology and politics because these
domains are more instrumental to understanding, and therefore
preventing, genocide.
For this task he turns to Lemkin. Shaw reads Lemkin through a
disciplinary lens: the original conception of genocide is in fact both
sociological and legal. Only within its subsequent history did the
law take over and "capture" the "terms of the genocide debate."
Shaw's return to Lemkin attempts to resuscitate the sociological
element of the original conception, and to elaborate further on that
conception in the light of subsequent historical events and efforts
at legally reforming the meaning of the term.
Of Lemkin's definition within Axis, Shaw finds two salient
aspects to genocidal violence: one is "destruction," the other is
"killing." The latter is merely one aspect of a concerted whole:
. The nuances of the key word, 'destruction', were
indicated here by the difference between
'immediate destruction' of a nation and 'destruction
of essential foundations' of its life. Lemkin was
clear that genocide refers generally to the latter;
'immediate' destruction in the sense of 'mass
killings of all members of a nation·, was a specific
type but did not define genocide. 33
In short, Shaw takes from Lemkin a sociological conception of
genocide: "Genocide, like barbarity, was a comprehensive concept
of the social destruction of national groups, and Lemkin believed
that it had very wide applicability."34
Unfortunately, "[w]hile Lemkin offered a socio-historical
conception of genocide, his conceptualization was heavily
influenced by the legal tradition."35 Shaw finds that this influence
narrows the meaning and thereby creates problems for the
conception and meaning of genocide. For instance,
[b ]oth Nuremberg and the Convention laid stronger
emphasis than Lemkin on physical and biological
destruction, and less on broader social destruction.
This difference is largely explicable because the
Id.
Id. at 19 (emphasis in original).
34
Id. at 21 (emphasis in original).
35
Id. at 23 .
32
33
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former were designed to apply and define genocide
law: killing and physical harm were the sharpest
ends of the destructive processes and thus obvious
legal foci. 36
With the creation of the new law to criminalize this newly
conceptualized violence, the sociological aspect of the
phenomenon gets left behind. Shaw catalogues and analyzes the
genocide literature 37 that both recognizes and bemoans this
discursive loss, since it represents a loss of understanding in the
meaning of genocide and, with it, the capacity to properly act
against genocidal violence.
Shaw must do three things in order to resuscitate and vindicate
a broader, socio-political conception of genocide. First, he must
find, as noted above, that the sociological and political meanings of
the term precede the legal meaning: they are more originary,
thereby laying claim to greater epistemological authority. Second,
since it was "first"38 within law that genocide was clearly defined,
Shaw must show how law is less faithful (and by implication less
authoritative) than the sociological and the political to
understanding the violence of genocide. Shaw does this by
integrating law to theory, in a broad sense, and characterizing both
as ideal forms of knowledge. As such, they are deemed less
relevant to the search for practical, instrumental forms of
knowledge to counter the scourge of genocide. The dethroning of
law (and theory) toward the development of an anti-genocidal
knowledge is hastened also through the linkage, even fusion,
between legal meaning and the perpetrator's perspective. 39
The third thing Shaw must do in order to vindicate a sociopolitica1 and, thereby, a broader definition extends from the first
two gestures: not only is a socio-political conception more
36

Id. at 22.
The list of scholars includes most of the well-known names in genocide
studies, such as Helen Fein, Barbara Harff, V. Dadrian, Michael Levene, Israel
Charny and Ben Kiernan in sociology. In law, Shaw mainly depends upon the
studies of William Schabas and Michael Mann.
38
SHAW, supra note 27, at 7. ("[I)t was in law that genocide had first been
defined (by Lemkin and the Genocide Convention) and it was in the legal field
that the most urgent challenges of new episodes were felt.")
39
Id. at 4 ("Above all, this book argues that genocide studies are stuck at the
preliminary stage of concept formation, defining genocide primarily in terms of
the 'intentions' of the 'perpetrators,' rather than looking at the structure of
conflict within which attempts to destroy populations and groups are played out.
I aim, therefore, to construct a more sociologically adequate concept of genocide
.. . .").
37
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authoritative (as originary), it is also more useful; that is, Shaw
must assert the superiority of instrumental over abstract and
philosophical knowledge. Perhaps in part because of this, or
because of his dependence upon a social-scientific framework to
the exclusion of a critique or knowledge of its own foundations 40to the exclusion of a critical self-knowing of the sociological
subject-his ethical and prescriptive conclusions, as I hope to
show, fall prey to the problems of disciplinarity, of coercive
hegemonic knowledge, outlined above with respect to the original
legal conception of the term. In short, Shaw concludes his
sociological and political conception of genocide, through
genocide's amalgamation with war, in what Said calls a subjective
and disciplinary "statement of power" 41 in relation to the objects of
genocide.
The first move in the dethroning of law 42 is to suggest that it is
primarily concerned with death and, as such, is opposed to a
political-sociological view of genocide that is primarily concerned
with destruction. The difference Shaw draws is between individual
death and social destruction: the latter encompasses the former,
and the former is merely one, albeit extreme and pervasive, aspect
of a social conflict described as genocide. Also, genocide is a
social event that implicates political conflicts and fractures; the
law's fixation on death is a criminal matter and its paradigm is the
murder of the individual. From this essential error, law reveals
40

On the human sciences more generally, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER
OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES (LES MOTS ET LES
CHOSES) 345-46 (Vintage Books 1973) (1966) ("Hence that double and
inevitable contestation: that which lies at the root of the perpetual controversy
between the sciences of man and the sciences proper- the first laying an
invincible claim to be the foundation of the second, which are ceaselessly
obliged in tum to seek their own foundation, the justification of their method,
and the purification of their history, in the teeth of 'psychologism,'
'sociologism,' and 'historicism'; and that which lies at the root of the endless
controversy between philosophy, which objects to the naivete with which the
human sciences try to provide their own foundation, and those same human
sciences which claim as their rightful object what would formerly have
constituted the domain of philosophy.").
On the origins of one human science, history, see also Said, supra note 26,
at 11. ("[I]n the methodological assumptions and practice of world historywhich is ideologically anti-imperialist- little or no attention is given to those
cultural practices, like Orientalism or ethnography, affiliated with imperialism,
which in genealogical fact fathered world history itself.")
41
Said, supra note 26, at 8.
42
SHAW, supra note 27, at 27 ("While law often informs as well as reflects social
debate, it is highly unusual for a major concept to be so strongly defined by a
legal document. Thus moving out of the restrictive legal framework is a major
issue for the sociology of genocide.").
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itself to be insufficient to provide "a complex, situational
account" 43 of genocide, specifically genocidal intent.
The second move, the isolation of law from the socio-political
domain-and indeed, all subsequent moves-flows from this
original error. The separation of law from the political is
articulated in two modes: first, the severance of genocide from war
(and law's integration of genocide to the individual murder
paradigm); and, related to that, the distinction between specific and
general intention. Shaw notes that "[t]he most striking fact about
the process that produced the [Genocide] Convention was its
separation of genocide from war."44 What Shaw understands this to
mean is that the law on genocide is radically severed from an
engagement with social processes as such, and is only concerned
with the result. War stands in for the political domain, the polis and
its procedures, conflicts, evolutions, and so on; law stands outside
this political and social dimension in its fixation on the end result
of these processes. Law sees this end through the lens of
"intentionality"; hence, the third move from the moment of error is
in the separation between what law means by "intent" and what the
political dimension means by "intent."
Law's paradigm, then, is the individual murder case. Applied
to a multilayered event such as genocide, the law so
conceptualized is inadequate. The core of Shaw's argument for this
inadequacy is in the legal requirement that the perpetrator of
genocide, like the murderer, be proven to have the criminal mens
rea, the state of mind-knowledge and intention- to commit the
crime. "However," Shaw cautions, "the legal understanding of
'intent' is narrow: the reference to 'intent' in the text indicated that
the prosecution needed to go beyond establishing that the offender
meant to engage in the conduct, or to cause the consequence. The
offender must also be shown to possess a 'specific intent' (do/us
specialis ). " 45 Shaw notes that "[ c )riminal law presumes that an
individual intends the consequences of his or her acts, in effect
deducing the existence of the mens rea from proof of the physical
act itself. " 46 Shaw suggests further that "the legal idea moves

43

Id. at 84 (noting that the "intent" requirement of law is too "singular" and thus
demands a complex, situational account to give it meaning).
44
Id. at 28 .
45
Id. at 82 (emphasis in original).
46
Id. at 83.
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'intent' beyond its ordinary meaning, in ways that unnecessarily
restrict understanding. " 47 Furthermore, Shaw notes,
[t]he emphasis on intention inherited from
international law derived originally from the fact
that genocide was seen in the same way as war
crimes, which were recodified at Geneva around the
same time as the Genocide Convention was drafted.
The idea of intentionalitr in genocide follows that
of 'wilful intent' in war. 4
As such, given the necessity for proof, Shaw suggests that,
[t]ypes of acts that constitute genocide- killing and
other harm against civilians-also occur in war,
where they may not always be criminal, or, if they
are, they may be [sic] easily be seen as war crimes
or crimes against humanity. This is another reason
why the law of genocide has been encumbered with
the idea of 'special intent. ' 49
The special intent requirement of law as a narrowing of
genocide's meaning does two things: it represents "only
perpetrators' intentions" and avoids an understanding of genocide
as, following Weber, the subjective "'meaning-complexes' of
genocidal action." 50 That is, the legal conception of genocide takes
genocide out of its political context, outside of war. In effect, Shaw
suggests that, "[t] he prevailing idea of genocide-action informed
by an intention to destroy social groups as such- is precisely a
pure, ideal-typical representation of the subjective meaning
involved in a general class of actions."51 This "ideal" of the
rationale for genocide takes only one point of view, whereas the
sociological view would be more relational: "A sociologically
adequate concept of genocide needs to build understandings of
types of action and relationships into a general account. This will
take us still further from the subjective meaning for perpetrators. " 52
47

He continues: "This tight concept of intention is sometimes reinforced by
sociologically unrealistic concepts of collective intention." SHAW, supra note 27,
at 83.
48
Id. at 84.
49
Id. at 85.
50
Id. at 86.
51
Id. at 87.
52
Id. at 91.
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As such, a more complex relational picture of genocide would
include the subjective meanings of victims as well as bystanders.
Citing to Weber, Shaw notes that, "[t]he term 'social relationship'
will be used to denote the behaviour of a plurality of actors in so
far as, in its meaningful content, the action of each takes account of
that of the others and is oriented in these terms." 53 Hence,
"[r]ecognizing the relational character of genocide moves us
towards an account of the kind of structure that it involves. " 54
By "structure," Shaw understands the "recurring patterns of
social action ... reproduced .. . . Genocide is therefore a structural
phenomenon in the sense that it is a recurring pattern of social
coriflict, characterized by particular kinds of relationships between
actors, and with typical connections to other conflict structures in
society." 55 In short, genocide is a kind of war. 56 Shaw makes this
explicit ("genocide's character as 'conflict' and 'war,"' 57 ) in his
"more precise sociological definition: genocide is not only a form
of social coriflict, but also a form of war. " 58 He notes that, "[t} he
difference [between genocide and typical warJ lies in the
construction of civilian groups as enemies, not only in a social or
political but also in a military sense, to be destroyed. Genocide,"
therefore, "remains as Lemkin first categorized it, an extreme form
of war that departs from the ideal-typical form of war in this
fundamental sense. " 59
Shaw extends Lemkin's original formulation by, in essence,
amalgamating genocide to war. He suggests that "modem warfare,
in both its interstate and guerrilla-counterinsurgency forms, should
be seen as degenerate war,''60 whereupon genocide is a further
projection of this form of war. Ostensibly there is a distinction
between genocide and war: in modem warfare, "the 'enemy'
civilian population was targeted as a means towards the defeat of a
53

Id. at 94 (citing MAX W EBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 118).
54
SHAW, supra note 27, at 95.
55

Id. at 96.
Id. at 36 ("War involves political, economic and ideological as well as military
power; so too genocide. Physical destruction is the ultimate manifestation of the
destructive process of war, but it is not what is going on most of the time in most
wars; so too in genocides. Thus genocide, like war, involves much more than the
mass killing through which we most easily recognize its destructiveness. Just as
war can occur without large-scale killing, genocide too can occur where this
element is not extensively carried out.").
51
Id. at 96.
58
Id. at 111.
59 Id.
60 Id.
56
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state and army" (hence, Dresden or Hiroshima are properly
understood under "the rubric of war," 61 ). However, in contrast,
genocide "constructs unarmed civilian populations as the objects
in their own right, of the types of armed violence normally applied
only to armed enemies. " 62 Despite this distinction and the
analytical importance of distinguishing between genocide and war,
Shaw notes:
Yet it is also important to understand the usually
intimate relationships between these different types
of campaign. War and genocide are often woven
together in the same campaign, so that, to describe
it as a whole, it is inadequate to talk only of 'war'
or of 'genocide '. Instead, we need to use the
concept of genocidal war that I introduced above:
two distinct types of policy integrated in a single
campaign. " 63
What is the meaning of this amalgamation of genocide and
war? It has required Shaw to attenuate and then sever the link
between genocide and law, first by locating genocide's legal
origins within the laws of war and then by specifying law's
fixation on death (only one of several consequences of genocide
understood as social conflict), and intentionality (specific with
respect to only one party to genocidal conflict) as productive of an
"ideal-typical" knowledge of the genocide perpetrator that leaves
incomplete an apprehension of genocide's relational aspects, i.e.,
genocide as political conflict. It has required him, then, to make a
distinction between law as an atomistic, or individuating, form of
knowledge, and war, which is part of the relational, political
process. In a sense, law is purified of "genocidal violence," in the
way law is conceptualized to posit a certain kind of "ideal"
knowledge of the violence. Violence is the purview of the political
process: the decision to wage war, the policy to attack civilians
either as combatants or "as such" (genocidal acts of war).
What, then, is Shaw's conceptualization of the political as
such? Violence pervades the category of the political; the question
becomes one of hierarchy. And it is within the development of a
hierarchy of political violence that Shaw submits a hierarchy of
violators, so to speak. Thus, genocide (genocidal war) is endemic
61

Id. at 111-12.
Id. at 112.
63
Id. at 148.
62
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to some societies, whereas other societies are incapable of this
form of violence. 64 Within Lemkin's subtext, the separation of
genocidal and non-genocidal polities is rationalized within a legal
conception. With Shaw, the same separation occurs, and is in fact
reinforced and policed, within the political domain. I have argued
that the original legal conception was disciplinary, inasmuch as it
projected
the
operation
of
a
border
(separation,
suppression/displacement, and policing) between the subject and
the object of genocide. Here also, Shaw's sociological and political
conception of genocide performs the same operation: that of a
border that separates and hierarchizes genocide's subject-observer
and object. This suggests that the integration of genocide within
the political, viz. genocide as war, involves a specific
conceptualization of the political domain itself.
Shaw's idea of the political ratifies a division within the world
between genocidal and non-genocidal geopolitical regions. Shaw
defines genocide as "acts" of violence, to escape from the
emphasis (at law) of the perpetrator's intent: "we also need the
concept of genocidal action (or genocide as action, a sense closer
to previous understandings) ... Thus genocide is a type of unequal
social conflict between two sets of actors, which is defined
primarily by the type of action carried out by the more powerful
side."65 By insisting upon political conflict within his definition, he
escapes or takes a "radical break"66 from the "ideas of 'onesidedness' and 'helplessness"' 67 characteristic of other definitions.
But paradoxically, because his approach "gives genocide a
broader scope than is often allowed" by defining genocide as "not
restricted to a very few big, successful mass murders," it is also
more ubiquitous within some societies than others and "[i]t is,
lamentably, more common than those preoccupied with the
peculiarities of the Holocaust imagine." 68 In the result, genocide as
war-especially the "total war" model-first eliminates law and its
fixation on mass death, the "big" event. Second, war in the
developed West has been largely abolished, and with it, genocide
(or genocidal actions): "Ethnic conflicts are rarely very violent
within the West not only because democracy has been normalized,
but also because state power has been internationalized and
interstate wars abolished. "69 Where the West does engage in war it
64

Id.
Id.
66
Id.
61 Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
65

at 135, 158-62.
at 154.
at 155.
at 157.
at 59.
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is not genocidal. 70 Third, war (total war) is pervasive within the
South: "In contrast, deep, institutionalized, internationalized
pacification has hardly developed in non-Western regions: major
'nation-states' are quasi-imperial and this is why their 'imperial
fringes' are dangerous. The way of war envisaged by major nonWestern states remains much closer to total war . .. :m
Shaw's conceptions both of genocide as war and of war as
social conflict within which occurs a collection of actions (some
genocidal, some not, depending upon "specific combinations in
particular cases") 72 , enable both a more pervasive model of
genocide and its specification as normative to certain political
arrangements or geopolitical realities. The border-metaphor applies
to the division between political arrangements. Essentially, the
border is the return of the law, to wit: "since genocide is an
illegitimate variety of the generally legitimate social activity of
war, understanding genocide in this way enables us to see the
connections-as well as the difference-between this kind of anticivilian violence and the more common kind perpetrated both
intentionally and unintentionally in warfare." 73
The metaphor of the border-operation suggests that Shaw's
understanding of the political domain as such is on a continuum of
violence. The border (law) separates states and regions and
suppresses a "self-knowledge," so to speak, of the potential
violence of the Western subject-a sense of the continuum of
violence itself, between objective manifestation (actions) "out
there" and subjective power arrangements and surveillance over
here. Finally, the border polices the political division between
regions by specifying a distinction between an "active" (violent)
South, and a passive-observatory North.
Pushing the border metaphor further, this policing operation is
not inconsequential with respect to the subject: the border
separates the subject itself from its own "political subjectivity," its
own access to subjecthood. As such, while it must be said that
Shaw's sociological and political conception of genocide is both
comprehensive, intuitive, and thus persuasive as an empirical
account of genocidal violence within the last century, his analysis
hinges upon a conception of the political category that denies
access to political subjectivity for both subject and object. The
observer's role in relation to wars, thanks to "[w]estern global
dominance, market and production integration, international law
70

Id. at
Id. at
72
Id. at
73
Id. at
71

158 ("new US-led occupations are not genocidal.").
159.
156.
154.
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and mass media," 74 is one of "global surveillance." 75 This role is
antithetical to "genocidal actions," and ostensibly "inhibits"
wars. 76 The implication of the "surveillance mechanism"77 as a
passive or at best benign 78 enterprise-it inhibits interstate wars, it
benefits victims-also impliedly separates the observer from the
potentiality of violence, as it were, inherent to the gaze. This is an
element of the separation of the subject from its own political
subjectivity, its own sense, if you will, that surveillance is active
and constructive. Shaw concedes only that the West's passive
surveillance or benign intervention may inadvertently have an
effect on those under the gaze, or those who receive it: "in reality,
life risks are transferred to them," i.e., to the "Southern war-zone
civilians."79
In the result, Shaw's conception of the political coheres with
what might be considered a normative perspective on how Western
power conceives of itself: according to its own disciplinary
practices and the production of knowledge about violence within
the world. For instance, Shaw notes-in response to Michel
Foucault's theory ofbio-power (modem sovereign exercises a right
of death through the "function of administering life," 80}-that,
"[g]enocide is practised by regimes and armed groups that hardly
have totalitarian ambitions or capabilities; conversely, today's
Western states certainly 'manage life' but they do not practise
genocide."81 It is the way we think of the world, the way we see it;
genocide is not simply a problem of totalitarianism or fascism, but
of failed, rogue, degenerate states, non-states, and non-state actors.
Genocide discourse where, as here, the concept of genocide is
sociological and political rather than legal, ratifies the normative
sense of this world view.
74

/d. at 159.
Id. at 160.
16 Id.
77
Id. ("The twenty-first-century context of war is one of global surveillance, by
Western states, the United Nations system, non-governmental organizations and
social movements, all working through and reflected in global networks of
media coverage.").
78
At worst, "[e ]ven where international intervention is substantial, it may often
become part of the conditions for genocide. Proto-genocidists may see
international pressure for power-sharing as a threat, prompting drastic action
against 'enemy' groups, as in Rwanda." SHAW, supra note 27, at 160.
Notice how this mutes any active role attributable to the observer. Compare this
passive view with, for example, ANDREW WALLIS, SILENT ACCOMPLICE: THE
UNTOLD STORY OF FRANCE'S ROLE IN THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE (2006).
79 s
HAW, supra note 27, at 159.
·
80
Id. at 135.
81 /d.
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Indeed, the conception of this world view, within Shaw's
schema, as norm becomes evident in the challenge posed to the
view by the theory of bio-power posited by Foucault. Furthermore,
its normativity-i.e., that this view seems "obvious" to us- is
reinforced by the return of law; purified of its own violence, law
authorizes and legitimates the political conception of the world as
conceived within a socio-political discourse on genocide through
the disaggregation of "legitimate" and "illegitimate" war.
Foucault enters Shaw's text like a rupture of the surface
normativity of genocide discourse and is quickly cauterized and
removed. This is because Foucault offers an alternative conception
of the political category as such. Shaw looks to Foucault for the
answer to specific questions: "Are there general reasons why the
phenomenon of genocide has developed? Can certain features
provide the principal elements of explanation for all particular
episodes?" Shaw concludes with: "In what follows I evaluate
explanatory frameworks bearing in mind these questions .... " 82
Shaw finds unhelpful, however, Foucault's theory of modern
power and why it should have led to the occurrence of genocide.
"For Foucault," he notes,
genocide represented a manifestation of modem
bio-power, reflecting the fact that 'life and its
mechanisms' had been brought 'into the realm of
explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an
agent of transformation of human life.' The
corollary of the state's management of life forces
was a new management of death: 'One might say
that the ancient right to take life or let live was
replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to
the point of death. ' 83
Shaw then notes: "Foucault had clearly absorbed the experiences
of total war and totalitarian genocide." 84 Shaw's next citation to
Foucault underlines both the integration of genocide with modem
war85 and the link within the bio-political sovereign between the
power over life and over death, to wit: "'massacres have become
vital . . . the existence in question is no longer the juridical
existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a
82

Id. at 133.
Id. at 134 (citations omitted).
84 Id.
85
Id. ("Wars are no longer waged in the name ofa sovereign who must be
defended ; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone .... ").
83
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population .... "'86 There, however, Shaw and Foucault part ways,
and it is at the level of conceptualizing the political that they seem
to disagree.
First, Shaw reproduces the passage in Foucault that contains
the only instance in which Foucault makes a "direct mention of
genocide." 87 It is both an interesting passage and the locus of
Shaw's interpretation of Foucault and, by extension, his own
definition of the political as such: '"[i]f genocide is indeed the
dream of modem powers,"' writes Foucault, "'this is not because
of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is
situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and
the large-scale phenomena of population. "' 88 Recall Shaw's
questions posed in the first instance to Foucault and others in the
section of the book entitled "Explanations." Shaw seeks a kind of
knowledge about genocide that will explain its source: what,
empirically, objectively, can we locate as the "general reasons" for
the occurrence of genocide? Does Foucault's theory of biopower
help in this regard? Shaw finds that Foucault's theory does no
more than locate the source of genocide within totalitarianism and
the instantiation, within modernity, of "total war."89 Furthermore:
Foucault's explanation that genocide is the
other side of the modem state's "function of
administering life," replacing capital and
corporal punishment with correction, seems
insufficient. Why should state forms that
increasingly eschew capital punishment
resort to the "orgies" of destruction and
murder
that
characterize
genocide?
Foucault's relatively unexamined idea of
genocide appears over-influenced by
particular pseudo-scientific, eugenic strands
of genocidal thought and the exceptionally
rationalized murder of the extermination
camps. 90
As such, since genocide perpetration has not empirically been
limited to totalitarian states or leaders, and since "Western states
Id.
Id. at I 34.
88
Id (citing MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: VOLUME 1: AN
INTRODUCTION 137 (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books ed. 1990) (1978)).
89 Id.
90
Id. at 135.
86
87
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certainly 'manage life' but they do not practice genocide," Shaw
concludes that "Foucault's linkages were suggestive but they
didn't exfilain the rise of genocide or why genocides are
1
initiated."
Although Foucault discusses the nature of modem war and
links it to genocide, his language intimates a different conception
of the political than that suggested by Shaw's analysis. In the
above passage where he mentions the word genocide, Foucault
calls it the "dream of modern powers," not the right (of the
sovereign) to kill that is "the reverse of the right of the social body
to ensure, maintain, or develop its life."92 Furthermore, in a
passage immediately preceding the "genocide" quotation, Foucault
notes that, as with atomic warfare, "the power to expose a whole
population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an
individual's continued existence." 93 I read this to mean not the
"other side," detached and other to the "function of administering
life" 94 but, rather, continuous with that function, its legitimating
basis. The idea of genocide as an underwriting exposure
legitimates power "exercised at the level of life, the species, the
race, and the large-scale phenomena of population."95
Shaw is right that Foucault's analysis is "general" (he
dismisses it as "too general,"96 ) and "suggestive."97 There is
something generalizing, immanent, and pervasive about a
conception of violence, in relation to power (its underside), not as
ideologically specific, but as fragmentary and as hard to locate as a
dream or an exposure. This is language that speaks to the systemic
relationship between power and violence, and of the knowledge
this relationship produces. It speaks less to a description of
genocide as specific actions, to what Shaw describes as a
"manifestation of the general 'power over life' ." 98 As such, the
reduction of Foucault to explanatory causes and effects (his
linkages do not "explain the rise of genocide or why genocides are
99
initiated" )-to an idea of genocide limited to the "total wars" of
recent history and the manifestations of ideology (totalitarianism),
to genocidal violence as "'orgies' of destruction and murder" 10091
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Id. at 137.
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says, in effect, that as disciplinary knowledge, Foucault's theory
fails. This failure is further underlined by suggesting that
Foucault's political formulations on the relationshi~ between
power and violence are based upon pseudo-science 1 1 and are
"over-rationalized." 102
But it is precisely as non- or failed-disciplinary knowledge, or
as a form of knowledge critical of disciplinarity, that Foucault's
theory intervenes within the discourse on genocide. As Foucault
puts it,
If there is one approach that I do reject, however, it

is that (one might call it, broadly speaking, the
phenomenological approach) which gives absolute
priority to the observing subject, which attributes a
constituent role to an act, which places its own point
of view at the origin of all historicity-which, in
short, leads to a transcendental consciousness. It
seems to me that the historical analysis of scientific
discourse should, in the last resort, be subject, not to
a theory of the knowing subJect, but rather to a
theory of discursive practice. 10
Foucault's point of departure is not, then, what he as observing
subject "sees"-violence on this scale is "totalitarian" 104-but
rather "the rules that come into play in the very existence of such
discourse," 105 i.e., the form of thought behind the disciplinary
knowledge produced by the scientist (sociologist, in this case).
Seen in this light, Shaw's reduction of Foucault's approach to a
failed disciplinary knowledge or conception of genocide seems
more clearly an instance of the separation, suppression and
policing-by the discourse on genocide--of the ways it is possible
to know genocide. And this policing operation is in fact normative
to the discourse; it is one of the "rules of formulation." 106 Thus,
Shaw argues for the sociological and political conceptions of
genocide as normative to how we know what genocidal violence
is. In effect, genocide is (normatively) a political and sociological
problem, and the sociological and political forms of knowledge,
these particular human sciences, are "normative" in relation to
101
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genocidal violence. So if one thinks of knowledge as a kind of
geographical terrain, with "genocide" and "the political"
superimposed upon one another, the question is: how much of the
one covers the other? More to the point: how does the discoursethe ways we think and speak about genocide---construct the
overlap between the political and the violence described as
genocidal?
Genocide, Shaw insists, is a non-Western phenomenon. And
yet, the West is "political" in the broad sense. Thus, genocidal
violence ("degenerate" 107 war) and the West ("legitimate" war)
subtend along a plane of the discursive understandings of violence.
Along the political spectrum, genocide represents degenerate,
failed, or indeed the non- or apolitical "object." It is only at this
end of the spectrum that Foucault's theory of bio-power as the
management of life has value for Shaw. In short, according to the
metaphor of superimposed terrains, genocide is dehors the
political. It sits at the end of a theoretical political continuum but is
in fact merely a simulacrum of the political. This is the construct of
the political as posited by the discourse on genocide, in its sociopolitical amalgamation to war. It is this concept of the political that
is normative, whereupon the political "subject" is non-genocidal,
and the genocidal "object" is non- or apolitical. And it is to this
normative, intuitive concept that Foucault's theory represents a
break, fusing each end of the spectrum into a single
conceptualization of the extension of modem (bio-) power, not at
the level of manifestation but of knowledge: what is known and
knowable by the ways power and violence are explained,
articulated, and understood discursively.
Foucault's theory, in short, challenges the role of the observer
and, thereby, the subject's distance from the object of observation.
It brings the ostensibly non-political object of the scientistic,
sociological gaze into proximity with the political subjectobserver. Shaw's interpretation of Foucault attempts to reassert the
disjuncture between observer and object. Shaw attempts to reassert
the norm of an exclusion of this "self-knowledge," whereas
Foucault's theory attempts to reinsert that knowledge as a
challenge to normative, scientistic, disciplinary knowledge. 108 By
107

SHAW, supra note 27, at 111.
Id. ("it [i.e., his history of science] describes the unconscious of science. This
unconscious is always the negative side of science- that which resists it,
deflects it, or disturbs it. What 1 would like to do, however, is to reveal a positive
unconscious of knowledge: a level that eludes the consciousness of the scientist
and yet is part of scientific discourse, instead of disputing its validity and
seeking to diminish its scientific nature.").
108
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showing, albeit in language that is suggestive and somewhat
elusive (genocide as a "dream" 109 of power), the linkages between
subject and object in relation to genocidal violence, his theory
limits the discursive border and its operations: separation,
suppression/displacement, and policing. It challenges the
separation of observer as passive in its surveillance, and of the
object as active/violent as such ("genocidal actions").
Foucault's theory of modem power, including the theory of the
panopticon, is a direct challenge to this passive construction of
power's exercise. In a passage that reads remarkably like the flip
side of Shaw's conception of the political domain as merely
passive surveillance, Foucault writes:
Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to
induce in the inmate a state of conscious and
permanent visibility that assures the automatic
functioning of power. So to arrange things that the
surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is
discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of
power should tend to render its actual exercise
unnecessary; that this architectural apparatus
should be a machine for creating and sustaining a
power relation independent of the person who
exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be
caught up in a power situation of which they are
themselves the bearers. 110
I read the "inmates" as both subject and object of surveillance,
with similar effects of power produced in both by the border
operation of the discourse. The point here, though, is not to suggest
that the theory of the panopticon fits neatly on all fours with the
whole global terrain under Western surveillance, but that the act of
surveillance has active and activating effects that, within the
discourse on genocide, are elided and suppressed. The norm that
evolves from this suppression posits to us, axiomatically, that we
within the liberal democracies do not "do" genocide, we merely
watch from the sidelines.
In summary, Shaw's amalgamation of genocide to war is an
attempt in the first instance to produce instrumental knowledge
about genocide, knowledge that can inform the development of
109
110
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anti-genocide strategy and policy. He removes genocide from law
by showing law's insufficiency as a conceptual basis for
understanding genocide. The consequence is threefold: First,
genocide as war expands the scope of genocidal violence"genocide as action"-to a broad swath of forms and
manifestations of power. Second, the law itself is rethought both as
free of "genocide" and therefore as freely applicable to the political
domain as the border dividing legitimate and illegitimate warfare
and war actions. Third, this division, likewise, applies to the
political category as such, to divide the world into geopolitical
regions according to genocidal and non-genocidal manifestations
of power. The West does not "manifest" its power in a genocidal
way: its wars are not genocidal. The South, on the other hand, has
the problem of pervasive genocidal violence; its conflicts are
marked by frequent genocidal actions. In a word, the South is
"genocidal." Within this bifurcated schema, the object of genocide
"acts" (genocidal actions), the subject observes; the former is
active, the latter passive.
What is most striking about Shaw's analysis, and therefore the
reason it is useful for an analysis of how genocide knowledge is
produced, is that it represents an innovation within the discourse
on genocide, moving the debate from its "capture" within the
limitative legal criteria under the Convention and toward a broader,
more "coherent" sociological conception. And yet the analysis
constructs the political domain as the mark and the reiteration of
the discursive operation of the legal discourse; it reinforces an
"ideal" of law itself as a border that authorizes a political
disjuncture between subject and object. The law's reduction,
separation and return also authorizes and legitimates a political
reduction and separation within the subject itself: the subject is
constructed as passive in relation to genocidal violence ("genocidal
actions") out there in the chaotic, apolitical South. The subject's
political subjectivity therefore is suppressed within this view of
itself as observer. In the result, the discourse on genocide, both
within its originary conception of genocide as a legal phenomenon,
and within its successful reconceptualization as a sociological and
political form of violence, remains captive to a normative ideal of
global power as benign and salvific: its exercise "inhibits" the
violence of the other, and its will is inherently legitimate. The
subjects of the discourse- we, the observers-are tamed into
passivity.
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CONCLUSION

Genocide discourse centers on the law, both within the original
formulation of the term by Lemkin and the subsequent definition
of the term within the Genocide Convention of 1948. The story of
the law's role in relation to the form of violence defined as
genocide, however, is more complicated than simply providing a
basis for definition and, thereby, a framework for subsequent
debates. The discourse moves from the extreme of a strict and
narrow understanding of this form of violence to the attempt to
abandon legal criteria in determining the conceptual parameters
and the meaning of the term "genocide" in relation to the form of
violence.
Within this Article, I have charted three trajectories for the law
pursuant to the meaning of genocide, or the knowledge of genocide
produced by legal and nonlegal discourses. First, the law provided
an originary basis for apprehending the violence. Second, the law
was understood as merely one of several possible frameworks for
apprehending the violence: the alternative sociological and
political conceptualizations of genocide required the excision of
law, its repudiation as adequate to produce a comprehensive,
consistent and practical knowledge about genocide. The third
movement of law was in its return, after the political decision, 111 to
ratify and authorize the political meaning of genocide. Law was
purified in order to perform an ex post legitimation, i.e., as law in a
pure sense, freed from ex ante "political constraints." 112
These three movements of law suggest that the discourse on
genocide, and the object it produces, is inescapably juridical, even
when the conceptualization of genocide is non-legal as such.
Shaw's provocative and successful amalgamation of genocide with
war is just such an attempt, clarifying the lineaments of the
discourse on genocide beyond its "capture" within the legal
framework. But just as Shaw's conception of the law's return to
legitimize the political decision is in a sense a purified idea(l) of
law, so also the political category is purified, pacified and,
111
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Id. (Shaw, following Reeves, suggests that the Commission of Inquiry on
Darfur report was flawed on both the facts and the law: "The commission's
factual distortions and logical failures could only be evidence, Reeves
concluded, of the political constraints under which they were working." As such,
law must be severed from the analysis of genocidal violence: "Clearly legal
decisions will always have to be made on the basis of the Convention and its
case law, but political decisions, at national and international levels, must
respond to the ideas of genocide that are held within world society.").
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counterintuitively, depoliticized. The domain of the political is
severed from the domain of genocidal violence; the former is
agentic, the latter is not. The former is cast as observer, as a power
of global surveillance, as delinked from genocidal violence, which
occurs at the end limit of the political spectrum.
I have suggested that this movement of separation is also one
of suppression: that the gaze of the observer, like Foucault's
panopticon, is not passive but in fact constructive--even violent.
This element, or self-knowledge, is both suppressed and policed by
the discourse on violence. The policing ensures the denial of
access to "the political," the subjectivity of the object of genocide.
But it has the corollary effect of denying self-knowledge to the
observer, i.e., access, for the subject, to its own political
subjectivity. The passive subject cannot "act" within the world
except as observer, because its active role in the construction of the
world is denied by the discursive framework within which it sees
the effects of its gaze only as the (objective) manifestations, or
actions, of the other.
In the final analysis, and toward the point of this exercise, the
depoliticizing of both law and politics has the effect of increasing
the level of violence in the world and arrogating, to only one side,
the concept of sovereignty. This is the dangerous consequence of
the discourse on genocide and its border-operation. The
amalgamation of genocide to war is in fact only to illegitimate war,
degenerate and other to the warfare of the (Western) subject. Thus,
both the legal and the political categories are purified of genocidal
violence by the discursive segregation of this form of violence to
the outside, away from the North.
Whereas law returns to authorize the political decision, the
latter is operative, within the discourse on genocide, as
observation, as description, and as passive in relation to genocide.
In effect, the political decision as "objective" observation is
purified of political subjective content. The result is that genocide
becomes pervasive, requiring ever more vigilant surveillance.
Shaw concludes: "[i]f a broader, more sociologically coherent
conception becomes accepted not just in academia, but in public
debate, then decisions about intervention (political and
humanitarian as well as legal and military) in genocidal crises will
be less easily avoided by confusing legal references." 113 Once
terrorist attacks become "genocidal massacres" 114 and "counter-
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insurgency war" is collapsed into "genocidal war," 115 the
geopolitical border is policed not simply by a passive and anxious
gaze, but by an increase in redemptive, "legitimate" violence:
saving the object from itself. Under this discursive schema, the
law's return is also the return of the sovereign as immanent use of
force.

115

Id. at 171.

